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Recanting Confidential Witnesses in Securities
Litigation
Gideon Mark*
This Article examines the contentious and recurring issue of how
courts should handle confidential witnesses in securities litigation who
recant the information attributed to them in complaints or deny that
they ever provided such information to plaintiffs’ counsel and/or
investigators. The use by plaintiffs of confidential witnesses has become
ubiquitous in recent years, as a primary unintended effect of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. That legislation raised the
bar for pleading securities fraud and established an automatic stay of
all discovery and other proceedings during the pendency of a motion to
dismiss, absent application of one of two narrow exceptions. The viselike combination of these features forces plaintiffs to plead their cases
with particularity while barring them from obtaining discovery to
bolster their scienter and other allegations until all motions to dismiss
have been resolved. In response, plaintiffs have turned to confidential
witnesses, who typically are current or former employees of the
defendant. These witnesses provide information anonymously for use in
complaints, mainly because they are fearful of retaliation by defendants.
In a recent series of high-profile cases, courts have been confronted
with allegations that plaintiffs’ confidential witnesses either have
recanted the information attributed to them, or denied ever providing
such information. This Article examines the contrasting approaches
taken by courts to alleged recanting, and provides some specific
recommendations for avoiding or resolving this problem in the future.

* Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Maryland School of Business. Professor
Mark holds degrees from Brandeis University, Columbia University, Harvard University, New
York University, and the University of California. Professor Mark thanks Dean Michael J.
Kaufman for inviting him to participate in the Loyola University Chicago Annual Institute for
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INTRODUCTION
One of the primary unintended effects of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)1 has been the widespread
use of confidential witnesses in class action securities litigation.
Confidential witnesses (“CWs”) are typically current or former
employees of the defendant company who anonymously provide
information to plaintiffs for use in their class action complaints. The
information, provided anonymously because the employees are fearful
of retaliation, is usually used by plaintiffs to bolster scienter allegations.
Two specific aspects of the PSLRA have sparked the use of CWs in
securities litigation. The first aspect is the PSLRA’s significantly
higher bar for pleading securities fraud. The PSLRA amended the
Securities Exchange Act2 to impose two strict pleading requirements,
both of which must be satisfied in order for a complaint to survive a
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a–78mm).
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motion to dismiss. A private securities complaint involving an
allegedly false or misleading statement must specify each statement
alleged to be misleading, the reason(s) why the statement is misleading,
and, if an allegation is made on information and belief, “all facts” on
which that belief is formed.3 In addition, the complaint must, with
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate the securities laws,
state with particularity facts giving rise to a “strong inference” that the
particular defendant acted with the required state of mind.4 The
required state of mind is “scienter,” which the Supreme Court has
defined as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.”5
The second aspect is the PSLRA’s automatic stay of all discovery
and other proceedings during the pendency of a motion to dismiss,6
absent application of one of two statutory exceptions.7 Congress
created the stay to prevent plaintiffs from (1) commencing securities
litigation with the intent to use the discovery process to coerce
settlements and (2) commencing such litigation as a vehicle to conduct
discovery in the hope of finding a sustainable claim.8 The stay applies
to both class actions and individual actions.9 If a motion to dismiss by
any defendant is pending, discovery is stayed for the entire case, even if
there are multiple defendants, some of whom have had their motions to
dismiss denied and/or have answered.10 The stay encompasses
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012).
4. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
5. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 & n.12 (1976).
6. Pre-PSLRA, defendants in federal securities cases were required to participate in discovery
during the pendency of motions to dismiss. Defendants could avoid discovery only by moving
for a protective order, requesting a stay, and showing good cause under Rule 26(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Such motions were typically denied. Gideon Mark, Federal Discovery
Stays, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 405, 434 (2012). Post-PSLRA, discovery is automatically
stayed. The statute provides: “In any private action arising under this chapter, all discovery and
other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court
finds upon motion of any party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or
to prevent undue prejudice to that party.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
7. The two exceptions are when particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or
to prevent undue prejudice to the party seeking relief. Id. § 77z-1(b)(1); id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B).
8. In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Thornburg Mortg.,
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV 07-0815 JB/WDS, 2010 WL 2977620, at *6 (D.N.M. July 1, 2010).
9. See, e.g., Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., Nos. 1:02 CV 157, 1:02 CV 370, 1:02 CV 382, 2002
WL 32121836, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2002) (“[B]y its plain language the statutory stay is not
limited to class actions.”); Med. Imaging Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Lichtenstein, 917 F. Supp. 717,
719–21 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that the PSLRA mandates a discovery stay in any private action
where a motion to dismiss is pending).
10. See Lane v. Page, No. CIV 06-1071, 2009 WL 1312896, at *1 (D.N.M. Feb. 9, 2009)
(“The result may be harsh, but Congress has clearly expressed a desire that discovery not proceed
in any securities litigation the PSLRA covers until all pending motions to dismiss have been
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discovery during the pendency of motions to dismiss amended
complaints11 and motions for reconsideration of orders on motions to
dismiss,12 and it is of great practical significance. Original complaints
are often amended multiple times in securities litigation, with the result
that many months or even years can pass before discovery begins.13
This is the typical pattern, because plaintiffs have generally failed in
their efforts to have the PSLRA’s automatic stay lifted, under either the
first14 or second15 statutory exceptions.
The vise-like combination of the PSLRA’s strict pleading
requirements and discovery stay explains the ubiquity of CWs.
Plaintiffs must plead their cases with particularity, but they are
generally barred from obtaining discovery to bolster their scienter and
other allegations before all motions to dismiss have been resolved.16
The result has been almost universal reliance by plaintiffs in class action
securities complaints on information provided by confidential

resolved.”); Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., Nos. 1:02 CV 157, 1:02 CV 370, 1:02 CV 382, 2002
WL 32121836, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2002) (holding that the stay applies even as to
discovery against co-defendants who have not filed motions to dismiss). But see Latham v. Stein,
Nos. 6:08-2995-RBH, 6:08-3183-RBH, 2010 WL 3294722, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2010) (lifting
stay as to certain defendants whose motions to dismiss had been denied).
11. Selbst v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 04 C 2422, 2006 WL 566450, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1,
2006).
12. McGuire v. Dendreon Corp., No. C07-800-MJP, 2009 WL 666863, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 11, 2009); Powers v. Eichen, 961 F. Supp. 233, 235–36 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
13. See, e.g., In re SemGroup Energy Partners, L.P. Sec. Litig., No. 08-MD-1989-GFK-FHM,
2010 WL 5376262, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 21, 2010) (“Thus, this lawsuit has been pending more
than two years, during which time plaintiffs have been almost completely precluded from
conducting discovery.”).
14. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., Nos. 02 MDL
1484(MP), 01 CV 6881(MP), 2004 WL 305601, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004) (refusing to lift
stay because defendants avowed they had taken all necessary steps to preserve all potentially
relevant electronic evidence).
15. The most commonly asserted basis for a claim of undue prejudice is the existence of
parallel litigation, or parallel criminal or regulatory investigations, which required class action
defendants to produce documents to other plaintiffs, the government, or an investigating body.
Courts usually reject this argument. See, e.g., Kuriakose v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Co., 674 F.
Supp. 2d 483, 486–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (refusing to lift stay where about 400,000 documents had
been produced by lead defendant during active investigations conducted by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and a House of Representatives committee);
see also In re Schering-Plough Corp./Enhance Sec. Litig., No. 08-397, 2009 WL 1470453, at *1
(D.N.J. May 19, 2009) (refusing to modify stay to permit plaintiffs to obtain documents
previously produced to government regulators and investigators).
16. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507, 530 (noting that
the PSLRA’s strict pleading requirements and stay “put[] a plaintiff in a vise: the pleading rules
require particularized allegations and a strong inference of scienter while the discovery stay
deprives the attorney of the conventional means to develop this information”).
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witnesses.17 Allegations based on such information often are the only
specific allegations in a complaint supporting a claim of securities
fraud.18 At the same time that plaintiffs have become reliant on the
information provided by CWs, courts have become increasingly
skeptical of such witnesses.19
The common use of CWs in securities litigation has highlighted
significant issues concerning pleading and discovery. One recurring
issue is the extent to which the information provided by confidential
witnesses must be discounted in the aftermath of the 2007 decision by
the United States Supreme Court in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd. (“Tellabs”).20 In Tellabs, the Court resolved a three-way
circuit split concerning whether and to what extent courts must consider
and weigh competing culpable and non-culpable inferences in deciding
whether a complaint has satisfied the PSLRA’s pleading requirement
that plaintiffs state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that defendants acted with the required state of mind. The
Court held that that to qualify as “strong” an inference of scienter must
be more than merely plausible or reasonable.21 Rather, a complaint will
survive a motion to dismiss “only if a reasonable person would deem
the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any

17. See, e.g., Douglas H. Flaum & Israel David, Disclosure of Confidential Witnesses in
PSLRA Cases, N.Y.L.J., May 31, 2012, at 1 (“Of the various tools employed by plaintiffs’
counsel in securities cases, few are more important than the use of confidential witnesses in
complaints.”); Andrew W. Stern, Dorothy J. Spenner & Cameron Moxley, Allowing Discovery of
a Confidential Witness’s Identity, LAW360 (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.sidley.com/files/
Publication/038bbbf8-aa12-4c7c-a7d2-05b6341d0606/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bab0c
52c-2000-40b0-90eb-09805607f48b/REV_Allowing%20Discovery%20Of%20A%20Confidentia
l%20Witnesss%20Identity%20_2_.pdf (noting that CWs “are increasingly becoming the
backbone of class action securities complaints”).
18. See THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. SEC. LITIG. COMM., SUBCOMM. ON USE
OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES, DIALOGUE ON THE CURRENT LAW AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
ON THE USE OF INFORMATION FROM AND THE DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY OF INFORMANTS 3
(Aug. 2009), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071798-UseofConfidential
Sources.pdf (“Given the restrictions of the PSLRA, informants are virtually the only means of
obtaining non-public evidence of wrongdoing at a company and are often essential for avoiding
early dismissal of a meritorious action.”) (The foregoing report includes separate sections written
by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel. The foregoing quotation is taken from the plaintiffs’
section.); see also Christopher Keller & Michael Stocker, Balancing the Scales: The Use of
Confidential Witnesses in Securities Class Actions, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 87 (2009)
(“[I]n the absence of publicly available information from SEC or Department of Justice
investigations, allegations based on information provided by confidential witnesses offer the ‘best
hope’ of plaintiffs surviving the PSLRA pleading standards.”).
19. Michele Odorizzi, Impact of the PSLRA on Securities Litigation, ASPATORE, June 2013,
available at 2013 WL 2137388, at *4.
20. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
21. Id. at 324.
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opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”22
The Supreme Court did not address the use of CWs. Nevertheless,
numerous federal courts have applied Tellabs to assess the use of such
witnesses. Many courts, following the lead of the Seventh Circuit in
Higginbotham v. Baxter, International, Inc.,23 have concluded that the
information supplied by confidential witnesses in securities fraud
complaints must be steeply discounted when deciding motions to
dismiss.24 Other courts have rejected Higginbotham and eschewed
automatic discounting.25
22. Id.
23. 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (“It is hard to see how information from anonymous
sources could be deemed ‘compelling’ or how we could take account of plausible opposing
inferences. Perhaps these confidential sources have axes to grind. Perhaps they are lying.
Perhaps they don’t even exist. . . . [A]llegations from ‘confidential witnesses’ must be discounted
rather than ignored. Usually that discount will be steep.”).
24. See, e.g., Minneapolis Firefighters’ Relief Ass’n v. MEMC Elec. Materials, 641 F.3d
1023, 1030 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Higginbotham and disregarding allegations by CWs); Ley v.
Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 811 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Higginbotham approvingly), abrogated
on other grounds by Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323-25 (2011);
Indiana Elec. Workers’ Pension Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 535 (5th Cir.
2008) (“Following Tellabs, courts must discount allegations from confidential sources.”);
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access Barriers to Remedies for
Securities Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 58 (2012) (“[T]here is a growing trend of
discounting allegations that are based on confidential witness statements.”); David Artman, Note,
Who’s Behind Door Number One?: Problems with Using Confidential Sources in Securities
Litigation, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1827, 1843 (noting Higginbotham’s strong influence).
25. See, e.g., Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc., 736 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2013). Although
influential in other jurisdictions, Higginbotham has attracted significant criticism from
commentators. See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme
Court and the Proper Role of Confidential Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, 36 SEC.
REG. L.J. 345 (2008) (arguing that Higginbotham is inconsistent with Tellabs). The Seventh
Circuit revisited the use of CWs approximately six months after Higginbotham was decided,
when it considered Tellabs on remand from the Supreme Court. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Tellabs II”). In that case, the Seventh Circuit
purported to distinguish Higginbotham and its steep discounting of allegations based on
information provided by CWs. Whereas Higginbotham’s confidential sources included three exemployees of defendant and two consultants for defendant, none of whose positions were
described with particularity, Tellabs II involved CWs whom the Seventh Circuit described as
numerous and consisting of persons who from their job descriptions were in a position to know
first-hand the facts to which they were prepared to testify. While Tellabs II can be and has been
read to represent a retreat from Higginbotham, the earlier case is alive and well. Nothing in
Higginbotham suggests that the Seventh Circuit’s holding concerning the steep discounting of
allegations by confidential witnesses was limited to the specific facts of that case. Moreover,
post-Tellabs II the Seventh Circuit restated the conclusions it drew in Higginbotham. See City of
Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. & Local 295/Local 581 v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir.
2013) (“Allegations concerning . . . unnamed confidential sources of damaging information
require a heavy discount. The sources may be ill-informed, may be acting from spite rather than
knowledge, may be misrepresented, may even be nonexistent—a gimmick for obtaining
discovery costly to the defendants and maybe forcing settlement or inducing more favorable
settlement terms.”).
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A second recurring issue is whether the names of CWs are
discoverable. Most courts have held that the PSLRA does not require
plaintiffs to identify by name the anonymous sources they use in their
complaints.26 In general, however, the witnesses must be “described in
the complaint with sufficient particularity to support the probability that
a person in the position occupied by the source would possess the
information alleged.”27 Discovery is a different matter. Most federal
district courts to consider the issue have held that the identities of
confidential witnesses who provide information set forth in a securities
fraud complaint are generally discoverable, once the PSLRA’s
discovery stay has been lifted.28 A sizable minority has held that the
identities are protected from disclosure as attorney work product and/or
on public policy grounds.29 No federal appellate court had resolved the
issue by early 2014.
A third recurring issue, which has become especially contentious in
the last few years, is how courts should handle the problem of CWs who
recant the information attributed to them in complaints, or deny that
they ever provided such information, after their identities have been
discovered. This third issue is the primary subject of this Article, which
proceeds in three parts.
Part I examines the incidence of recanting by CWs in securities
litigation, Part II considers four recent high-profile cases involving
alleged recanting, and Part III discusses insights to be drawn from the
recanting cases. The fundamental conclusions are four-fold: (a) courts
should refuse to permit the depositions of CWs while motions to
dismiss are pending and should decline to consider the affidavits of

26. See Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J. CORP. L. 551, 558
(2011) (identifying federal circuit courts rejecting notion that CWs who provide information used
in securities fraud complaints must be identified by name in the complaints).
27. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000); Dawes v. Imperial Sugar
Co., No. H-11-3250, 2013 WL 5442109, at *18 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2013). Courts do not permit
plaintiffs to provide this information in camera, in lieu of setting it forth in a complaint. See
Joseph C. Weinstein & Joseph P. Rodgers, Unmasking Confidential Witnesses?, LAW360 (June
23, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/172877/unmasking-confidential-witnesses (noting
that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois refused to allow plaintiffs to
provide information regarding confidential witnesses in camera).
28. See generally Jennifer H. Rearden & Darcy C. Harris, Growing Trend Favors Disclosure
of Witnesses’ Identities, 23 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. (Fall 2012), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/ReardenHarrisGrowingTrendFavorsDisclos
ureofWitnessesIdentities.pdf (noting that courts have increasingly required confidential witnesses
to reveal their identities during discovery).
29. See Flaum & David, supra note 17, at 1. See generally Jeff G. Hammel & Elizabeth R.
Marks, Confidential Witnesses: Reliable Source or Imaginary Friend?, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 1300 (2013) (discussing district court split on discoverability of CWs).
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allegedly recanting witnesses in connection with such motions; (b)
plaintiffs’ counsel should participate in the pre-filing interviews of their
CWs, rather than delegating the task to their investigators; (c) some
CWs who recant—perhaps many of them—do so falsely, under
pressure; and (d) false recanting occurs in part because courts permit
discovery of confidential witnesses.
I. THE INCIDENCE OF RECANTING
As noted above, the PSLRA imposes an automatic stay of discovery
and other proceedings while motions to dismiss are pending.30 When
the motions to dismiss are denied, the stay is lifted. In most cases
defendants then seek discovery of plaintiffs’ confidential witnesses,
primarily to test whether the witnesses will confirm the information
attributed to them in plaintiffs’ complaint.31 And, as noted above, the
unmistakable trend is for federal district courts to permit such discovery
to occur. When defendants ascertain the identities of CWs and depose
them, the opportunity arises for the witnesses to recant, deny, or modify
some or all of the information attributed to them by plaintiffs. In some
recent high-profile cases, such recanting32 has occurred, or has been
alleged to have occurred. The new version of events can be used by
defendants to support a motion for full or partial summary judgment.
But, as indicated below, evidence of recanting often becomes available
in the form of declarations or affidavits even before the discovery stay
has been lifted. In these situations, the evidence has been used by
defendants, properly or not, to support motions to dismiss under Rule
12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”),
motions to strike under Rule 12(f), motions for reconsideration of
denials of motions to dismiss, and/or motions for sanctions under Rule
11.
How common is recanting? There is some dispute about this. Some
commentators believe that recanting is quite common.33 But a review
30. See supra text accompanying notes 6–15.
31. See Carl H. Loewenson, Jr. & James J. Beha II, Reliability of Confidential Witnesses in
Securities Fraud Complaints, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 2013, at 2 (“Once a case proceeds to discovery,
however, defendants are typically able to learn the identities of confidential witnesses and probe
the accuracy of their statements.”).
32. “Recanting” is sometimes characterized in criminal cases as an unequivocal repudiation of
prior testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Tobias, 863 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988). In this
Article, the term is sometimes used more broadly to also include denials that purported statements
were ever made, and modifications of prior statements.
33. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Dickey & Brian M. Lutz, The SEC’s Final Whistleblower Rules:
The Floodgates Open on a New Wave of Whistleblower Claims, as the SEC Authorizes Massive
Bounties to Anonymous Tipsters, 8 SEC. LITIG. REP. 1, 5 (2011) (asserting that CWs “have shown
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of recent cases suggests the incidence of actual recanting may be lower
than is often asserted. In some cases the declarations submitted by
allegedly recanting CWs reflected only immaterial differences between
the declarations and plaintiffs’ complaints.
For example, in
Minneapolis Firefighters’ Relief Ass’n v. Medtronic,34 the court
concluded that differences between the declarations of thirteen CWs and
the allegations in plaintiffs’ amended complaint were “mostly
innocuous”35 and, with regard to many of the witnesses, the declarations
merely challenged the implications drawn in the complaint.36 Similarly,
in Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Employees Welfare Fund v.
Regions Financial Corp.,37 the court, after reviewing affidavits from
allegedly recanting CWs and the interview notes from plaintiffs’
investigator, concluded that “nothing in the affidavit statements of the
CWs contradict[s] the statements in the Amended Complaint.”38 And in
BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Securities Litigation (“BankAtlantic”)39 the
themselves to be far too easily coaxed by plaintiffs’ counsel or their private investigators to
misrepresent, exaggerate, or misstate the facts”); Alison Frankel, The Confidential Witness
Conundrum in Securities Class Actions, REUTERS, Sept. 20, 2012 [hereinafter Frankel,
Confidential
Witness
Conundrum],
available
at
http://investorshub.advfn.com/
boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=79784848 (“[T]he truth is that just about every major
securities class action firm has seen witnesses say one thing to plaintiffs’ investigators and
another to former employers after their identity is revealed.”); Douglas W. Greene, How to Solve
the
Flawed
Confidential
Witness
Issue,
LAW360
(Apr.
8,
2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/430766/ how-to-solve-the-flawed-confidential-witness-issue (referring to the “recurring and pervasive problem” of flawed CW allegations, but noting that many
cases involve only “garden variety inaccuracies”); Kevin LaCroix, The Confidential Witness
Problem in Securities Litigation, D&O DIARY (July 15, 2013, 4:18 AM), http://www.dan
dodiary.com/2013/07/articles/securities-litigation/the-confidential-witness-problem-in-securitieslitigation/ (“The pattern recurs often that after the dismissal motion is denied, and the witnesses’
identities are known and their testimony is questioned, the witnesses recant.”).
34. 278 F.R.D. 454, 463 (D. Minn. 2011).
35. Id. at 463–64
36. See id. at 463 (“As with most of the witnesses, what [CW-12] takes issue with are the
implications that can be drawn from the way Plaintiffs presented his statements or the information
he gave them. But this disagreement does not amount to proof that Plaintiffs misrepresented
anything.”).
37. No. CV 10-J-2847-IPJ (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2011) (order denying defendant’s motion to
reconsider and/or certify for interlocutory appeal).
38. Id. at 8. In a subsequent order, the court noted that plaintiffs’ investigator provided the
court with an eight-page signed affidavit, in which she asserted that the information she provided
to plaintiffs’ counsel for use in the complaint was true and correct. See Local 703, I.B. of T.
Grocery and Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. CV 10-J-2847-S, 2012 WL
6049724, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 4, 2012) (documenting the court’s receipt of the signed affidavit).
But cf. In re Cabletron Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 30, 34 (D.N.H. 2006) (noting that
information in CW affidavits obtained by defendants was “far less incriminating” than the court
had been led to believe by plaintiffs’ second amended complaint).
39. 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp,
Inc., 503 F. App’x 677 (11th Cir. 2012).
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court found that, with respect to five of six CWs, there was no basis to
conclude that the allegations attributed to them in the first amended
consolidated complaint lacked evidentiary support.40
II. RECENT CASES INVOLVING ALLEGED RECANTING BY CONFIDENTIAL
WITNESSES
Courts confronted with alleged recanting by CWs in securities fraud
cases have taken a variety of approaches. These contrasting approaches,
taken in some of the most prominent cases involving this issue, are
discussed below.
A. Campo
Campo v. Sears Holdings Corp.41 is one of the first major cases to
consider the problem of flawed allegations by confidential witnesses. In
Campo, former shareholders of Kmart Holding Corporation sued Sears
Holdings Corporation (the legal successor to Kmart), the former
chairman of Sears, and the former chief executive officer of Kmart for
alleged securities violations. Plaintiff’s complaint relied heavily on
information provided by three confidential witnesses.42 Defendants
moved to dismiss, and that motion was denied without prejudice in
2008 based on information allegedly provided by the CWs. 43
Subsequently, the court ordered the depositions in 2009 of the CWs to
determine whether they supported the allegations attributed to them in
the complaint, and whether the motion to dismiss should have been
granted. After considering only those allegations by the CWs that were
corroborated by them in depositions,44 the court reversed course and
granted the motion to dismiss.45 On appeal, the Second Circuit
unanimously affirmed the judgment of the district court in an
unpublished Summary Order. Citing Higginbotham, it found no error in
the court’s order that the confidential witnesses be deposed or in the
court’s consideration of their deposition testimony in weighing
40. Id. at 1312. However, the court reached a different conclusion with respect to the sixth
CW. The court found a Rule 11 violation with respect to use by plaintiffs of this witness.
Because the plaintiffs cited this CW as a source of information in only five paragraphs of the
ninety-eight-page first amended consolidated complaint, the violation was de minimus, and
defendants were awarded only the reasonable fees and expenses they incurred in deposing that
witness and one-tenth of the reasonable fees and expenses they incurred in preparing their motion
for sanctions. Id. at 1321–22.
41. 635 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 371 F. App’x 212 (2d Cir. 2010).
42. Id. at 335.
43. Id. at 330 n.54.
44. Id. at 330.
45. Id. at 336.
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plaintiff’s allegations.46 According to the Second Circuit, the district
court “relied upon the deposition testimony for the limited purpose of
determining whether the CWs acknowledged the statements attributed
to them in the complaint.”47 However, the Second Circuit also
remarked that anonymity frustrates the process for weighing inferences
that was set forth in Tellabs.48
B. SunTrust
In Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc. (“SunTrust”),49
plaintiff brought a putative class action against defendant SunTrust
Banks, Inc., its auditor, and related defendants, alleging securities
violations. Defendants successfully moved to dismiss, but plaintiff was
given leave to amend. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended
complaint, which included numerous allegations attributed to a CW, but
that motion was unsuccessful.50
Defendants later moved for
reconsideration, on the basis of three declarations submitted by the
confidential witness, who by that point was no longer anonymous.51 In
his declarations the CW contradicted several of the statements attributed
to him in the amended complaint and denied having ever made such
statements to plaintiff’s investigators.52 On the basis of these
declarations the court granted the motion for reconsideration and
dismissed the amended complaint.53 The court found that, based on the
CW’s declarations, “the positions Plaintiff took in its Amended
Complaint were misleading or, at least, unsupported.”54 The court did
not, however, impose Rule 11 sanctions.55
C. Boeing
Another prominent decision on this topic is the Seventh Circuit’s
2013 opinion in the securities fraud class action against the Boeing
Company.56 In that case plaintiffs sued Boeing and two executives who

46. Campo, 371 F. App’x at 216 n.4.
47. Id. Under the Second Circuit’s rules this decision does not have precedential effect, but
may be cited.
48. Id.
49. 896 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (N.D. Ga. 2012).
50. Id. at 1217.
51. Id. at 1220–22.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1233.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. and Local 295/Local 581 v. Boeing, 711 F.3d 754 (7th
Cir. 2013).
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allegedly deceived investors regarding stress tests conducted on
Boeing’s new 787-8 Dreamliner aircraft. The first amended complaint
was dismissed without prejudice by the district court. The second
amended complaint included four new paragraphs concerning a CW
described as Boeing’s senior structural analyst engineer and chief
engineer. Expressly relying on the new allegations attributed to the
CW, the district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the second
amended complaint.57 Subsequently, the CW was identified and
deposed, and he denied virtually everything that plaintiffs’ investigator
had reported.58 In fact, he had never been a Boeing employee. He had
been employed by a contractor for Boeing, but he denied that he ever
worked on the Dreamliner 787-8, the model in question.59 Moreover,
none of the plaintiffs’ lawyers had met or talked to the CW until six
months after they filed the second amended complaint,60 which
included allegations based on information allegedly provided by him.
Following his deposition the district court granted defendants’ motion
for reconsideration and dismissed the case with prejudice.61 On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Richard Posner (who was
part of the earlier Higginbotham panel), cited Higginbotham, affirmed
the dismissal of the action, and remanded for consideration as to
whether sanctions should be imposed on plaintiffs’ lawyers under Rule
11.62
D. Lockheed
As of this writing the most recent opinion involving alleged recanting
was issued post-settlement by Judge Jed Rakoff in July 2013 in the
securities fraud class action against Lockheed Martin Corporation.63 In
that case, plaintiff, an institutional investor, sued Lockheed and some of
57. City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., No. 09 C 7143, 2011 WL 824604, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2011).
58. 711 F.3d at 760.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Boeing, 2011 WL 824604, at *5.
62. Boeing, 711 F.3d at 762. The PSLRA requires that upon final adjudication of private
securities actions, courts shall include in the record specific findings regarding compliance by
each party and each attorney representing any party with each requirement of Rule 11(b) as to any
complaint, responsive pleading, or dispositive motion. If a party is determined to have violated
Rule 11, the PSLRA requires that sanctions be imposed after giving such party or attorney notice
and an opportunity to respond. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (2012). Following remand in Boeing,
briefing on the sanctions issue was completed in December 2013. The district court had not
resolved the issue by mid-March 2014.
63. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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its directors and officers, principally alleging that defendants had made
statements about the first-quarter 2009 performance of one of
Lockheed’s divisions that they knew were materially misleading.64
Plaintiff’s amended complaint relied heavily on information purportedly
provided by multiple CWs, who were current or former Lockheed
employees.65 Defendants moved to dismiss, and that motion was
denied,66 in part on the basis of the information attributed to the CWs.
Discovery then commenced. Defendants obtained the names of the
CWs and deposed them. Defendants then moved for partial summary
judgment, asserting that in their depositions several of the CWs had
recanted or denied making the statements attributed to them. In
response, plaintiff argued that if the CWs had changed their stories, this
was only because Lockheed had pressured them to do so.67
Judge Rakoff sua sponte ordered plaintiff’s investigator and the five
CWs implicated by defendants’ assertions to appear and testify in court
at the October 2012 hearing on defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. After hearing testimony Rakoff denied defendants’ motion
in a summary order, with an opinion to follow.68 The case then settled.
Later, in July 2013, Rakoff issued a post-settlement opinion69
explaining his denial of the motion for summary judgment and making
some important observations about the CWs and the investigator in the
case. With respect to the investigator, Judge Rakoff concluded that
“[the investigator’s] report of his findings to plaintiff’s counsel was
accurate in all material respects.”70 With respect to the CWs, Rakoff
noted that their testimony “bore witness to the competing pressures this
process has placed on [them] and the impact such pressures had had on
their ability to tell the truth.”71 He also noted that some of the CWs
“had been lured by the investigator into stating as ‘facts’ what often
were merely surmises, but then, when their indiscretions were revealed,
felt pressured into denying outright statements they had actually

64. Id. at 635.
65. Id.
66. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 359,
375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
67. Lockheed, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
68. See City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 11 Civ.
5026(JSR), 2012 WL 6429784 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2012) (denying defendants’ motion for
summary judgment without expressing opinion on the underlying merit of the pending “omnibus”
motion for summary judgment).
69. Lockheed, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 633.
70. Id. at 637.
71. Id. at 636.
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made.”72 Judge Rakoff ultimately determined that the record did not
support a finding of misconduct by plaintiff’s counsel or investigator.73
Finally, Rakoff concluded that the combined effect of the PSLRA and
cases like Tellabs was likely to make problems associated with the use
of CWs “endemic.”74
III. INSIGHTS FROM THE RECANTING CASES
The cases described above yield several insights and suggestions for
best practices concerning the issue of confidential witnesses who recant.
Those insights and suggestions are described below.
A. Courts Should Refuse to Permit the Depositions of CWs While
Motions to Dismiss are Pending
The first insight concerns the Campo case, which permitted the
depositions of CWs prior to resolving a motion to dismiss. In the
aftermath of the Second Circuit’s decision in 2010, many defense
lawyers expected and hoped that Campo would initiate a trend.75 It did
not, and that is appropriate, because Campo was decided incorrectly
with respect to this issue.
Post-Campo, those courts to consider the issue have rejected attempts
to depose CWs prior to resolving motions to dismiss. They have done
so for multiple reasons. First, the PSLRA’s automatic discovery stay
prohibits the taking of such depositions during the pendency of motions
to dismiss.76 Second, the consideration by a court of deposition
testimony in this situation violates Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules,

72. Id. at 637.
73. Id. at 637–38.
74. Id. at 638. Judge Rakoff gave final approval to the settlement two weeks later. See City
of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 11 Civ. 5026(JSR), 2013 WL
3796658 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013) (holding that the proposed settlement was fair, reasonable, and
adequate).
75. See Bryan B. House, The Fact Pattern Behind the Boeing Class Action Grounding,
LAW360 (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/429130/the-fact-pattern-behind-theboeing-class-action-grounding; see also Loewenson & Beha, supra note 31, at 3 (“[W]hen
defendants can identify with particularity potential inaccuracies or discrepancies in confidential
witness statements, courts should permit pre-motion-to-dismiss discovery into the identity and
reliability of confidential witnesses.”); Joseph C. Weinstein & Joseph P. Rodgers, Unmasking
Confidential Witnesses?, LAW360 (June 23, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles
/172877/unmasking-confidential-witnesses (“Many securities litigators believe Campo is a step in
the right direction.”).
76. See, e.g., Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217
n.6 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (noting court’s prior refusal to life discovery stay to permit deposition of
CW); In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Sec. Litig., 836 F. Supp. 2d 878, 912 n.15 (D. Minn. 2011); In re
Cell Therapeutics, Inc., No. C10-414MJP, 2010 WL 4791808, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 2010).
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which generally prohibits consideration of material beyond the
pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.77 Third, the Second
Circuit’s assertion that anonymity frustrates the inference-weighing
requirement set forth in Tellabs reflects an overbroad reading of the
Supreme Court’s decision, “which is confined to discussions of
inferences drawn from the allegations of the complaint.”78 Fourth, the
endorsement by the Second Circuit of the district court’s approach in
Campo was non-binding dicta.79
Courts have taken conflicting approaches when confronted with a
closely-related issue: the submission of declarations or affidavits from
recanting CWs whose identities have been uncovered by defendants
before the discovery stay has been lifted. In In re St. Jude Medical, Inc.
Securities Litigation,80 defendants identified one of plaintiffs’ CWs and
submitted her affidavit during the pendency of a motion to dismiss. The
affidavit asserted that the complaint misrepresented her recollections. 81
After expressing doubt about the propriety of addressing the factual
accuracy of an affidavit on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court decided to
ignore the few allegations attributed solely to that witness.82
In Waldrep v. ValueClick, Inc.,83 plaintiffs’ securities class action
complaint included information purportedly provided by six
confidential witnesses.84 After the complaint was filed, defendants
independently identified, located, and interviewed the CWs.
Defendants then obtained declarations from the six witnesses, which
directly contradicted the information attributed to them in the
complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss and for Rule 11 sanctions.
Plaintiffs moved to strike the declarations, or alternatively, for
discovery related to the Rule 11 motion.85 The court denied the motions
by both plaintiffs and defendants.86

77. In re Cell Therapeutics, Inc., 2010 WL 4791808, at *2; cf. In re St. Jude Med., 836 F.
Supp. 2d at 901 n.9 (expressing doubt about the propriety of addressing the factual accuracy of an
affidavit submitted by a CW in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).
78. In re Cell Therapeutics, Inc., 2010 WL 4791808, at *1 n.2.
79. Id. at *2. Commentators have been critical of Campo. See, e.g., Kaufman & Wunderlich,
supra note 24, at 59 & n.22 (2012) (asserting that the decision violates both the PSLRA’s
discovery stay and Rule 12(d)).
80. 836 F. Supp. 2d at 878.
81. Id. at 901 n.9.
82. Id. The motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. Id. at 912.
83. No. CV 07-05411 DDP (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. 2008) (order denying plaintiffs’ motion to
strike the declarations of the confidential witnesses).
84. Id. at 1.
85. Id. at 2.
86. Id.
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In In re ProQuest Securities Litigation (“ProQuest”),87 defendant
ProQuest sought and obtained a declaration from a confidential witness
who denied most of the allegations attributed to her in the first
consolidated class action complaint.
The federal district court
concluded that by seeking and obtaining a declaration from that CW
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss, ProQuest “engaged in
discovery which was wholly improper.”88 The court neither struck the
offending declaration on the ground that it violated the discovery stay,
nor imposed Rule 11 sanctions for pleading allegations in bad faith.
Instead, when ruling on the dismissal motion, it chose to discount, but
not ignore, the information attributed to the CW in the complaint.89
In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Securities Litigation90 (“Par
Pharmaceutical”) is a fourth case raising this same issue. In this case,
defendants moved for Rule 11 sanctions during the pendency of their
motion to dismiss, on the basis of a declaration they obtained from
plaintiffs’ CW-1. The witness claimed in her declaration that a private
investigator hired by plaintiffs misquoted her, took information out of
context, and ignored other information provided by her in order to make
improper inferences and conclusions.91 Plaintiffs moved to strike the
declaration, on the basis that its submission violated the PSLRA’s
automatic stay provision.92 The court, after citing ProQuest’s “cautious
approach,”93 granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike the declaration
submitted by CW-1 and denied defendants’ motion to strike the
paragraphs in the second amended complaint that were based on the
disputed information.94
The court in Par Pharmaceutical declined to endorse “any rule per
se.”95 The absence of such a rule has resulted in the judicial
inconsistency exemplified by the cases discussed above. There should
be a uniform approach to this issue, and it should be the same one taken
by courts rejecting Campo. As indicated, those courts considering the
issue have concluded, contrary to Campo, that permitting the
depositions of CWs before the discovery stay is lifted violates the

87. 527 F. Supp. 2d 728 (E.D. Mich. 2007).
88. Id. at 740.
89. Id. The motion to dismiss was denied. Id. at 747.
90. No. 06-cv-3226 (PGS), 2009 WL 3234273 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2009).
91. Id. at *11.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *12.
94. Id. The case later settled. See In re Par Pharm. Sec. Litig., No. 06-3226 (ES), 2013 WL
3930091, at *8 (D.N.J. July 29, 2013) (approving final settlement following fairness hearing).
95. Par Pharmaceutical, 2009 WL 3234273, at *12.
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PSLRA. The same conclusion should apply with respect to the
submission of declarations or affidavits from recanting CWs. The
PSLRA requires that “all discovery and other proceedings” be stayed
pending any motion to dismiss.96 Courts have tended to interpret this
provision broadly.97 As such, the submission of a declaration from a
recanting CW during the pendency of a motion to dismiss may
constitute “discovery” or “other proceedings,” and thus fall within the
ambit of the PSLRA’s stay. As noted, in Par Pharmaceutical the court
did strike a recanting CW’s affidavit,98 and in ProQuest the court
concluded that by seeking and obtaining a declaration from a CW
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss, defendant engaged in
discovery which was wholly improper.99 Other courts have held that
the PSLRA’s automatic stay does not encompass investigatory
interviews conducted during the pendency of a motion to dismiss.100
But those cases can be distinguished, at least in part because they did
not involve submission to the court of recanting affidavits. They merely
involved interviews of prospective witnesses.101
In any event, whether or not a recanting confidential witness did
make statements attributed to him in a complaint is essentially a
credibility question,102 and a motion to dismiss is not the proper vehicle
to test the credibility of witnesses. The Supreme Court was clear in
Tellabs that credibility assessments are within the purview of the
ultimate trier of fact.103 Accordingly, courts should decline to consider
affidavits or declarations from recanting CWs when deciding motions to
96. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012).
97. See, e.g., Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., Nos. 1:02CV157, 1:02CV370, 1:02CV382, 2002
WL 32121836, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2002) (observing that “the reference in the [PSLRA]
statute to a stay of ‘all discovery’ is to be interpreted broadly”).
98. See infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.
99. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133–34 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (finding that plaintiffs had not established a justification for lifting the stay); In re
Tyco Int’l Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 00-MD-1335-B, 2001 WL 3407521, at *2–3 (D.N.H. Jan. 30,
2001) (denying a request to prohibit third party interviews).
101. See, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1133–34 (noting that the PSLRA
does not prohibit interviewing prospective witnesses).
102. See In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1312 (S.D. Fla.
2011), aff’d sub nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 503 F. App’x 677 (11th Cir. 2012)
(“Whether the confidential witnesses initially made the statements attributed to them in the
complaints is essentially a credibility question.”); Wu Group v. Synopsis, Inc., No. C 04-3580
MJJ, 2005 WL 1926626, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005) (“[W]hether the [CW] statements were
made is essentially a credibility question.”).
103. The Supreme Court stated that it is “within the jury’s authority to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve genuine issues of fact, and make the ultimate determination whether
[defendants] acted with scienter.” 551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007).
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dismiss or motions to reconsider denials of motions to dismiss.
B. Plaintiffs’ Counsel Should Participate in the Interviews of Their
CWs
A common element in many of the securities cases involving CWs
who recant, in whole or in part, is that the pre-filing interviews of the
CWs were conducted only by investigators for plaintiffs’ counsel, and
not by counsel themselves. This was true, for example, in Boeing,
where none of plaintiffs’ lawyers met or spoke with their CW until six
months after the filing of the operative second amended complaint.104
It also was true in BankAtlantic, where class counsel relied on the
detailed notes and memoranda provided by their investigators, who
conducted the CW interviews.105 And it was true in Applestein v.
Medivation, Inc.106 In that case the district court dismissed with
prejudice a third amended securities fraud complaint based largely on
information allegedly provided by three CWs. 107 The court concluded
that the information attributed to two of the CWs contradicted
information provided by these same witnesses in the prior second
amended complaint, as well as information attributed to a third CW.108
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs’ counsel
acknowledged that neither they nor their investigators had spoken to
two of the three CWs, and instead they relied on hearsay statements
passed onto the third witness.109 Similarly, in SunTrust, plaintiffs’
confidential witness never met plaintiffs’ investigators in person and
apparently never communicated at all with plaintiffs’ attorneys.110
The failure by counsel for plaintiffs to directly participate in the prefiling interviews of the CWs that they plan to rely upon for the key
allegations in their complaints does not by itself constitute a Rule 11
violation. An attorney has a non-delegable duty to analyze the facts and
law that support a pleading or motion, but that duty does not extend to

104. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
105. BankAtlantic, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1311.
106. 861 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
107. Id. at 1038–39, 1044.
108. Id. at 1038.
109. Id. at 1038–39.
110. See Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1232 (N.D.
Ga. 2012) (“It appears here that no lawyer representing Plaintiff ever met with or interviewed [the
CW] about what he knew, whether he was credible, or even how long he actually worked for
SunTrust and the currency of his knowledge.”); Loewenson & Beha, supra note 31 (noting that in
SunTrust, the CW never met in-person with plaintiffs’ investigators and never communicated at
all with plaintiffs’ counsel).
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personally gathering the facts.111 Nevertheless, the failure by plaintiffs’
counsel to directly participate in the pre-filing interviews of CWs is a
likely source of many of the problems that have developed in recent
years. Any witness, confidential or not, may speculate or provide
opinions, rather than facts. And an investigator may mistake a witness’
conjecture for fact.112 Later, when the investigator transmits his
interview notes or report to counsel, this may result in the drafting of
complaints that fail to reflect the CWs’ factual knowledge. If counsel
were to directly participate in the interviews, then the foregoing
problems likely would be reduced, at least in part because an
experienced litigator should be better-equipped than an investigator to
distinguish conjecture from fact.113 At the same time, the value of
information provided by CWs would increase, perhaps significantly so.
Of course, counsel could improperly interpret, infer, and/or extrapolate,
based on information provided to them by a CW. But it is likely this
would occur less often than when only the investigator conducts the
interview.
Some plaintiffs’ counsel have argued that it would be unethical for
them to personally interview CWs, because it could subject them to
being called to testify as witnesses in the securities litigation in which
the information from the CWs is to be used.114 This argument is
meritless. If correct, the argument would preclude lawyers from
evaluating the credibility of their own potential witnesses in any civil or
criminal action.115
As a best practice, plaintiffs’ counsel should conduct CW interviews
in conjunction with counsel’s investigators.116 But this will not always

111. In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1311 (S.D. Fla.
2011), aff’d sub nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 503 F. App’x 677 (11th Cir. 2012).
112. Loewenson & Beha, supra note 31, at 3.
113. See id. (“[M]any problems raised by the use of confidential witnesses could be solved
simply by requiring plaintiffs’ counsel to take a more active role in assuring the reliability of precomplaint factual investigations.”).
114. See SunTrust, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (noting that this argument would be a “dubious
and unprecedented interpretation of any professional ethics code”).
115. See id. at 1232 n.21 (“Plaintiff’s misguided interpretation of attorney participation in
interviews would prohibit prosecutors from interviewing witnesses during criminal investigations
and prohibit a responsible lawyer from evaluating witness credibility during the investigation of
criminal charges or civil claims.”).
116. See Matthew Tolve, Christin Hill & William Alderman, Say Hello to My Imaginary
Friend! Judge Posner, Seventh Circuit Issue Stern Warning to Plaintiffs’ Firms for Again Citing
Bogus Confidential Witnesses, ORRICK SEC. LITIG. & REG. ENFORCEMENT BLOG (Apr. 2, 2013),
http://blogs.orrick.com/securitieslitigation/2013/04/02/say-hello-to-my-imaginary-friend-judgeposner-seventh-circuit-issue-stern-warning-to-plaintiffsfirms-for-again-citing-bogus-confidentialwitnesses/ (“[T]he takeaway is clear: plaintiffs’ counsel needs to talk to the witnesses it cites in a
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happen. At a minimum, if counsel refrain from participating directly in
CW interviews, then they should ensure that their investigators follow
best practices. In Lockheed, plaintiff’s investigator did not meet with
the confidential witnesses in-person, did not tape-record his telephone
calls with them, and did not ask any member of his staff to join him on
his telephone calls with the witnesses. Instead, the investigator chose to
rely on his non-stenographic notes of the telephonic conversations,
made contemporaneously as the calls took place.117 As noted by Judge
Rakoff, these interview practices “were less rigorous than would have
been typical of, say, a federal law enforcement agent.”118 In Lockheed,
the investigator’s report of his findings was accurate in all material
respects,119 notwithstanding the foregoing. This may or may not have
been the result of good fortune. As a matter of best practices, however,
investigators interviewing CWs in securities cases should meet inperson with the witnesses and record the interviews or should conduct
the interviews with at least one member of the investigator’s staff also
present and taking contemporaneous notes. If distance or other factors
render in-person interviews unfeasible, then the telephonic interviews
should be recorded.
Some members of the defense bar have suggested that courts should
require complaints in securities cases to include factual allegations
about the experience and reliability of the investigators that plaintiffs
use, or about the pre-case investigation itself.120 Such a requirement
seems unnecessary, unduly burdensome, and difficult to apply. It is
unclear, for example, what kind of allegations would suffice as to the
reliability of an investigator. Moreover, requiring a complaint to
include specific details about plaintiffs’ pre-case investigation would
risk the forced disclosure of attorney work product.
It also has been suggested that plaintiffs’ counsel should be required
to obtain from each of their CWs a declaration and/or a certification that
he has read the complaint and agrees with the description of the
complaint, not rely exclusively on the reports of its investigators, even more so when those
investigators express doubt about the information they’ve uncovered.”). But cf. Max Stendahl,
Robbins Geller Says Boeing Suit Doesn’t Warrant Sanctions, LAW360 (Oct. 29, 2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/483969/robbins-geller-says-boeing-suit-doesn-t-warrantsanctions (citing plaintiffs’ counsel in Boeing for proposition that prosecutors commonly and
properly delegate to investigators the task of interviewing witnesses).
117. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633,
637 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Loewenson & Beha, supra note 31 (proposing that courts require “factual allegations
about investigators’ experience and reliability or about the pre-case investigation itself”).
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information he has provided.121 According to one proponent of this
requirement, “it would prevent most CW problems, and make the ones
that do arise much easier to resolve.”122 It may indeed be the case, as
suggested, that most credible CWs with accurate information to provide
would want to provide a certification, to avoid the major disruption that
can result if a complaint does not accurately reflect the witness’
account.123 But this proposal may come accompanied by logistical
problems.
For example, if the certifications are to be filed
contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint, they might need to
be filed under seal and made inaccessible to defendants, to preserve the
CWs’ anonymity at the pleading stage of litigation. If the certifications
are not to be filed at the onset of a case, but instead to be held by
plaintiffs’ counsel, certainly they should be discoverable once discovery
commences.
More troublesome is the situation where a CW is identified by
defendants, who submit a recanting declaration from one of plaintiff’s
CWs during the pendency of a motion to dismiss or a motion for
reconsideration following denial of a motion to dismiss. For the reasons
indicated above, defendants should be precluded from submitting such a
declaration. Arguably the submission violates the automatic stay.
Moreover, submission of a recanting declaration, followed by unsealing
(or submission) of the CW’s certification, would require the court to
make a credibility determination in connection with a motion to dismiss.
Again, for the reasons indicated above, such a determination should not
be made at this stage of the litigation.
C. Some CWs Falsely Recant Because They Feel Pressure to Do So
It is clear that some and perhaps much of the recanting by CWs that
has taken place in recent years in securities cases has resulted from
pressure and/or fear of retaliation by defendants. Counsel for plaintiffs
in securities class actions assert that such recanting as a result of
pressure is quite common.124 Plaintiffs made a form of this argument in
Boeing. According to plaintiffs, the CW lied at his deposition because

121. See Douglas W. Greene, How to Solve the Flawed Confidential Witness Issue, LAW360
(Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/430766/how-to-solve-the-flawed-confidentialwitness-issue (discussing three reforms to solve the CW problem).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., LaCroix, supra note 33 (citing unidentified leading plaintiffs’ lawyer for
proposition that “confidential witnesses always recant, because of the financial and other pressure
their employer can bring to bear on them, regardless of how precise, specific and detailed their
prior testimony had been”).
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he wanted to remain in the good graces of defendant Boeing.125
Specifically, according to plaintiffs, the CW wanted to obtain a job with
Boeing.126 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, observing that
“left unexplained is why he would not have wanted to remain in those
good graces when he was interviewed by [plaintiffs’] investigator.”127
A reasonable answer to that question is that when he was interviewed
by plaintiffs’ investigator his identity as plaintiffs’ CW was unknown to
Boeing. At his deposition, of course, his identity was known to Boeing,
and the risk of falling out of favor with the company was substantially
greater. As the court noted in BankAtlantic, discrepancies between
statements attributed to a confidential witness in a complaint and the
CW’s subsequent deposition testimony may be attributed to “the desire
to remain in a former employer’s good graces once the protection of
confidentiality has been removed.”128
The Second Circuit has observed that imposing a general requirement
of disclosure of confidential sources could deter informants from
providing critical information to investigators in meritorious cases or
invite retaliation against them.129
Numerous other courts have
agreed.130 This chilling effect and risk of retaliation are precisely why
federal courts have adopted a general rule that CWs need not be
identified by name in securities fraud complaints.131 But even as the
chilling effect and risk of retaliation have been minimized at the
pleading stage, such adverse effects have multiplied as federal courts
have permitted discovery of CWs both before (as in Campo) and after
the PSLRA’s discovery stay has been lifted.
Retaliation can take many different forms, some more subtle than
others, including: being fired, socially ostracized, intimidated,
125. City of Latonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 2013).
126. See Greene, supra note 33 (noting plaintiffs’ argument that CW’s recantation was caused
by his desire to work directly for Boeing).
127. Boeing, 711 F.3d at 760.
128. In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1312
(S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 503 F. App’x 677 (11th
Cir. 2012).
129. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000).
130. See, e.g., In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) (asserting that
requiring plaintiffs to name their confidential internal corporate sources would “have a chilling
effect on employees who provide information about corporate malfeasance”); Selbst v.
McDonald’s Corp., Nos. 04 C 2422, 04 C 3635, 04 C 3661, 2005 WL 2319936, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 21, 2005) (same); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 220 F.R.D. 30, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(noting that the Novak rule “encourage[s] whistle-blowers to expose corporate wrong-doing by
protecting them from retaliation”).
131. The adoption of this general approach is described in MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, 26A
SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES § 24:53.10 (2013).
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demoralized, humiliated, demoted, or blacklisted; being denied a
promotion, overtime, or benefits; and/or being formally disciplined,
reassigned, or given a reduction in wages or hours.132 And it is clear
that the incidence of retaliation against whistleblowers is high. One
study found that 82% of the whistle-blowing population had been fired,
quit their job under duress, or had significantly altered responsibilities,
as a result of their whistleblowing activities.133 Other surveys have
found that up to two-thirds of whistleblowers lose their jobs and due to
blacklisting, most never work in their fields of expertise again.134
Moreover, retaliation is not limited to current employees. Retaliation
also is a serious issue for former employees—the category into which
most CWs in securities litigation fall.135 In an analogous situation, the
Fifth Circuit has noted three reasons why the informant’s privilege136

132. See C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL
POWER 31–32 (2001) (“The usual practice is to demoralize and humiliate the whistleblower,
putting him or her under so much psychological stress that it becomes difficult to do a good
job.”); Geoffrey C. Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley
Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 91, 120–21 (2007) (“Although
the precise incidence of ostracism of whistleblowers is difficult to determine, researchers
universally mention it as a leading consequence of blowing the whistle. . . . [S]ocial ostracism of
whistleblowers is a more common retaliatory technique than adverse employment action.”);
Gerard Sinzdak, Comment, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a More
Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1668 (2008)
(“[W]histleblowers are frequently the victims of both formal and informal retaliation.”).
133. See Sarah Johnson, Study: Sarbox Curbs Fraud Whistleblowing, CFO.COM (Feb. 13,
2007), http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8694488?f=related.
134. See ALFORD, supra note 132, at 18–19 (“Somewhere between half and two-thirds of
whistleblowers lose their jobs, . . . most never work in the field again. In some tight-knit fields
there is an informal blacklist.”).
135. See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Accusations of Confidential Witness Chicanery Backfire on
Defense Lawyer, REUTERS, Dec. 5, 2012, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2012/12/05/accusations-of-confidential-witness-chicanery-backfire-on-defense-lawyer/
(noting that securities fraud complaints commonly rely on information from former employees).
136. Pursuant to Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), decided by the United States
Supreme Court more than fifty years ago, the government has a privilege to withhold from
disclosure both an informant’s name and facts tending to reveal the informant’s identity. Id. at
59. The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in
effective law enforcement and to make retaliation as difficult as possible. See, e.g., United States
v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 324 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The government’s strong and legitimate interest
in protecting confidential sources from premature identification is undeniable. Identification not
only compromises the government’s ability to use such sources in other investigations, it may
expose them to retaliation by those against whom they have cooperated.”). The informant’s
privilege is applicable in both criminal and civil cases. See, e.g., Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944,
946 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Although originally applied in the context of criminal proceedings, the
‘informer’s privilege’ is also applicable in civil cases.”); D.M. v. Cnty. of Berks, No. 12-6762,
2013 WL 3939565, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2013) (same). But see Higginbotham v. Baxter, Int’l,
495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (“There is no ‘informer’s privilege’ in civil litigation.”). While
the informer’s privilege likely applies in both civil and criminal cases, in the former it applies to
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should be applied with respect to former employees in cases involving
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).137 First, employers almost
always require prospective employees to supply names of prior
employers as references when applying for a job. Former employees
“could be severely handicapped in their efforts to obtain new jobs if the
defendant should brand them as ‘informers’ when references are
sought.”138 Second, it is possible that a former employee could be
subjected to retaliation if his new employer discovers that the employee
previously cooperated with the government.139 Third, a former
employee may find it desirable or necessary to seek re-employment
with the defendant, thus exposing himself to the same risk of retaliation
as a current employee.140 This risk of retaliation is not mere
conjecture—most whistleblowers never work in their fields again.141 In
light of the foregoing factors, a number of courts have agreed that the
FLSA protects both current and former employees from retaliation.142
It is frequently suggested that appropriate protective orders can
protect CWs in securities cases who are fearful about safety or
security.143 But such orders do nothing to protect against the risk of
retaliation described above. They also do nothing to protect against the
pressure exerted by defense counsel who interrogate CWs during their
depositions about possible breaches of the confidentiality clauses in
statements given to federal investigators but not to statements given to private attorneys. See
Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., No. 07-61542-CIV, 2009 WL 3856458, at *5 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 17, 2009) (“While there may be a privilege that protects persons who give statements to
government investigators in the civil context, there is no such privacy for private civil
litigation.”).
137. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
138. Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir.
1972); accord Dole v. Int’l Ass’n Managers, Inc., No. 90-0219PHX RCB, 1991 WL 270194, at
*3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1991) (discussing how an informant will likely face difficulties in gaining
future employment in large part due to the difficulty the witness may have obtaining adequate
references from his or her previous employer).
139. Hodgson, 459 F.2d at 306.
140. Id.; accord Dole, 1991 WL 270194, at *3.
141. Rapp, supra note 132, at 118.
142. See, e.g., Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 343 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that the
FLSA protects both current and former employees from retaliation); Phillips v. M.I. Quality
Lawn Maint., Inc., No. 10-20698, 2010 WL 4237619, at *4-6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2010) (rejecting
the argument that retaliation claims must be dismissed when brought by former employees);
Dole, 1991 WL 270194, at *3 (explaining that the threat of retaliation exists for former
employees); Donovan v. Forbes, 614 F. Supp. 2d 124, 126 (D. Vt. 1985) (stating that present or
former employees who have provided information to the Department of Labor under the FLSA
are protected from disclosure).
143. See, e.g., Loewenson & Beha, supra note 31 (“Witnesses with legitimate concerns about
safety or security can be protected by appropriate protective orders.”).
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their severance agreements.144 Under Rule 26(c)(1) of the Federal
Rules, a protective order must be premised on good cause,145 and courts
typically find that general statements regarding a serious risk of
retaliation do not satisfy the standard. Rather, plaintiffs are required to
make a specific showing that disclosure will cause a clearly defined and
serious injury.146 Courts generally decline to find such injury,
especially where the CW is a former employee.147
In Boeing, the merits of plaintiffs’ argument that their CW lied at his
deposition to remain in Boeing’s good graces are unclear.148 In other
cases, however, it is apparent that recanting witnesses have falsely
recanted under pressure. In Lockheed, plaintiff argued that the recanting
CWs had changed their stories “because of financial and other pressures
Lockheed had brought to bear upon them once they had been identified
by name.”149 Judge Rakoff’s careful opinion suggests that plaintiff was
correct, at least in part. As the opinion notes, some of the CWs “felt
144. See Frankel, Confidential Witness Conundrum, supra note 33 (“[I]t’s one thing for
[CWs] to talk to plaintiffs’ investigators. It’s another for them to stick by their allegations when
their former employers’ lawyers start grilling them in depositions about the confidentiality
provisions in their severance agreements.”).
145. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (stating that a court may, for good cause, issue a protective
order).
146. See, e.g., In re Marsh & McLennan Sec. Litig., No. 04 Cv. 8144(SWK), 2008 WL
2941215, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2008) (stating that the threat of retaliation requires specific
factual support); Brody v. Zix Corp., No. 3-04-CV-1931-K, 2007 WL 1544638, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
May 25, 2007) (holding that the conclusory assertion of consequences to CWs if their identities
were revealed “does not come close to establishing a genuine risk of retaliation”); Plumbers &
Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., No. C01-20418JW, 2005 WL 1459555, at *7
(N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005) (“Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence indicating that there is a
real fear of retaliation from Cisco.”); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV. A. MDL 1219, 1999
WL 354527, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 1999) (denying protective order because plaintiffs failed to
make specific showing that defendant “ha[d] attempted to intimidate individuals connected with
this case or ha[d] a history of such intimidation in other cases”).
147. See, e.g., Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 630 Pension-Annuity Trust Fund v.
Arbitron, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 335, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting the applicability of protective
orders to guard against the risk of retribution by CWs’ current, future, or past employers); Flaum
& David, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that courts are reluctant to find a realistic possibility of
retaliation if the CWs are no longer employed by the defendant).
148. What is clear is that, as noted above, contrary to plaintiffs’ allegations, their CW had
never been employed by the company, and he had never been interviewed by plaintiffs’ counsel
before his deposition was taken. See supra notes 125–27; see also Paul C. Gluckow & David B.
Edwards, Recent Trends Regarding the Use of Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 45
REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 141, 144 (2012) (“At best, a recanting confidential witness
creates discrepancies that plaintiffs can attempt to explain away through faulty memory, the
passage of time, or a whistleblower’s desire to stay in the good graces of the defendant. But, at
worst—in [Boeing], for example—a recanting confidential witness can result in dismissal and/or
sanctions due to lack of adequate evidentiary support.”).
149. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633,
636 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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pressured into denying outright statements they had actually made.”150
The opinion also notes that there was only one statement attributed to
the CWs in the amended complaint that was clearly inaccurate, and that
was the result of a drafting error by counsel that was later corrected.151
Another example is In re Dynex Capital, Inc. Securities Litigation
(“Dynex”).152 In Dynex the court denied in part a motion to dismiss the
second amended complaint, relying heavily on a number of allegations
that were purportedly derived from statements of nine CWs. Discovery
then took place. Near the close of discovery lead plaintiff identified the
nine CWs.153 Defendants moved for case-dispositive sanctions after
five of the CWs provided declarations asserting that they did not make
the statements attributed to them in the second amended complaint, and
a sixth CW declared that he had no recollection of making the
statements attributed to him.154 In response, plaintiffs’ counsel
submitted declarations stating that they had interviewed the CWs and all
of the paragraphs in the second amended complaint accurately reflected
what was communicated in their interviews. They also submitted their
notes of their purported interviews with the CWs. 155 The court denied
the motion for case-dispositive sanctions, noting, inter alia, that the
interview notes did not contradict the declarations submitted by
plaintiffs’ counsel.156 Importantly, the court also accepted as plausible
scenarios both that (1) some of the CWs recanted to remain in the good
graces of Dynex, their former employer,157 and (2) the CWs may have
been pressured by defense counsel to change their statements.158
D. False Recanting Occurs in Part Because Courts Permit Discovery
of Confidential Witnesses
As noted above, some and perhaps much of the recanting by CWs in
securities cases that has occurred in recent years has been a direct result
of pressure and/or fear of retaliation by defendants. In turn, the
opportunity for this pressure to be exerted is a direct result of the
unmistakable trend for courts to compel discovery of the names of

150. Id. at 637.
151. Id. at 637–38.
152. No. 05 Civ. 1897(HB)(DF), 2011 WL 2581755 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2011), adopted by
2011 WL 2471267 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011).
153. Id. at *2.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at *4.
157. Id.
158. Id. at *4 n.7.
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confidential witnesses once the discovery stay has been lifted (and
sometimes earlier). Most federal district courts to have considered the
issue now reject the argument that the identities of CWs are protected
from disclosure by the attorney work product doctrine or on public
policy grounds.159 Accordingly, once a case proceeds to discovery,
defendants are typically able to unmask the witnesses.
This
environment fosters an atmosphere in which defendants are able to
pressure their current and former employees to recant. Perhaps it is
time for courts to reexamine the discoverability of CW identities.
CONCLUSION
As Judge Rakoff noted in Lockheed Martin, the widespread use of
confidential witnesses in securities litigation is an unintended
consequence of the PSLRA (and cases like Tellabs).160 Judge Rakoff
concluded that problems associated with the use of CWs are likely to
become endemic.161 One such problem is recanting by the witnesses.
Recanting may not occur as often as some observers suggest, but it has
occurred on a number of occasions. And some percentage, perhaps a
substantial percentage, of this recanting is false. Various solutions to
the problem of flawed CWs have been proposed, but some of these
proposals are as flawed as the witnesses. Permitting the depositions of
CWs prior to the resolution of motions to dismiss is both unwise and
contrary to the express provisions of the PSLRA. Likewise, courts
should decline to consider declarations by recanting CWs in the context
of motions to dismiss. One solution that could prove effective is for
plaintiffs’ counsel to actively participate in the interviews of each of the
CWs whom they intend to use as source material for allegations in their
complaints, rather than delegating the interviews to their investigators.
Such participation is likely to solve many of the current problems. A
second possible solution is for plaintiffs’ counsel to obtain from each of
their CWs a certification that he or she has read the complaint and
agrees with the description of the information he or she provided. This
proposal has some logistical problems, but if those can be overcome, it
may prove viable. Finally, it may be time for courts to reconsider their
current majority view that the identities of CWs in securities cases are
discoverable, even if the witnesses will not testify at trial. Limiting
159. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. Sec., Derivative, and ERISA Litig., No. 08 MDL
No. 1963, 2012 WL 259326, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2012) (citing cases finding no work product
protection for identities of CWs).
160. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633,
638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
161. Id.
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discoverability, as some courts currently do, could help solve the
problem of false recanting.

